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SOCIAL MEDIA, VENUE AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
Leslie Y. Garfield Tenzer*
Judicial failure to recognize social media’s influence on juror decision
making has identifiable constitutional implications. The Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial demands that courts grant a defendant’s change of venue
motion when media-generated pretrial publicity invades the unbiased
sensibility of those who are asked to sit in judgment. Courts limit publicity
suitable for granting a defendant’s motion to information culled from
newspapers, radio, and television reports. Since about 2014, however, a
handful of defendants have introduced social media posts to support their
claims of unconstitutional bias in the community. Despite defendants’
introduction of negative social media in support of their claims, these same
courts have yet to include social media in their evaluation of pretrial
publicity bias. But social media is media, and as this article demonstrates,
trial court judges faced with deciding change of venue motions have a
constitutional obligation to include social media in their evaluations.
The collective refusal to treat social media the same as biased television,
radio, or print media, suggests an erroneous assumption on the part of lower
courts that social media is somehow different. This article identifies three
reasons as justification for dismissing social media: social media is too
recent a medium to fully understand and analyze, social media is not a
legitimate news source, and social media is opinion based. Application of
pretrial social media publicity to long-standing Supreme Court change of
venue doctrine, coupled with its exploration of scientific and social research
on social media influence, debunk these lower court rationalizations.
This article demonstrates that the reluctance of courts to consider social
media evidence when deciding whether to grant a motion for a change of
venue is a violation of any defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
On a larger scale, the article demands that courts embrace our new reality.

*
Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. I gratefully acknowledge
the thoughtful advice and keen insights of participants of the Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty
Colloquium Series. I would especially like to thank Professor Wendy Tenzer for her attention to
this piece, and Richard Montalvo for his outstanding research assistance.
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Social media intersects with criminal justice, and our daily lives, in ways that
demand judicial recognition.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Social media is media. The Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial demands
that courts grant a defendant’s change of venue motion when mediagenerated pretrial publicity invades the unbiased sensibility of those who are
asked to sit in judgment. Courts limit publicity suitable for granting a
defendant’s motion to information culled from newspapers, radio, and
television reports.1 Despite defendants’ introduction of negative social media
in support of their claims, these same courts have yet to include social media
in their evaluation of pretrial publicity bias. 2 But social media is media and,
as this article demonstrates, trial court judges faced with deciding change of
1

See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
See generally In re Dan Farr Prods., 874 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Tsarnaev,
157 F. Supp. 3d 57, 67 (D. Mass. 2016); Commonwealth v. Pal, No. 207 MDA 2015, 2015 WL
7253650 at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2015).
2
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venue motions have a constitutional obligation to include social media in
their evaluations.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee defendants the right to
be judged by a fair and impartial jury.3 Where pretrial publicity has created a
demonstrable negative impact on a jury pool, a judge, upon a defendant’s
motion, may move a trial to a new venue. The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Constitution to permit changes of venue where the “totality of
circumstances” created by newspaper, television, and radio demonstrates
either actual prejudice among venirepersons or where the likelihood of bias
among members of the community is so high, the trial judge can presume
prejudice to the degree that it would make it unlikely to find a fair jury. 4
Since about 2014, a handful of defendants have introduced social media
posts to support their claims of unconstitutional bias in the community. 5
Lower courts, arguably concluding that Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and the
like are different from the traditional media, have refused to include negative
social media evidence in their constitutionally-mandated evaluations.6 Their
collective refusal to treat social media the same as biased television, radio, or
other traditional news media, suggests an erroneous assumption that social
media is somehow different. By ignoring social media bias, these courts
create a constitutional threat to defendants’ due process rights.
This article proves that courts must consider social media evidence when
evaluating whether to grant a defendant’s change of venue motion. Part I of
this article details courts’ consistent responses to cases where pretrial

3
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; id. amend. XIV, § 1. The Constitution’s Seventh Amendment
governs the right to trial by jury in civil cases, and although impartiality is not mentioned explicitly
therein, courts have treated it as an implicit guarantee. Id. amend. VII. As recently as 2016, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Dietz v. Bouldin, ruling that a civil jury may be recalled after
dismissal as long as its impartiality has not been compromised. 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1897 (2016). On
behalf of the Court, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote, “Immediately after discharge, a juror could text
something about the case to a spouse, research an aspect of the evidence on Google, or read reactions
to a verdict on Twitter. Prejudice can come through a whisper or a byte.” Id. at 1895.
4
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1878); see also Stroud v. United States,
251 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1919); United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454 (1956); Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727–28 (1961); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963); Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 545 (1965).
5
See, e.g., Pittman v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-CA-000124-MR, 2014 WL 3548250, at *3
(Ky. Ct. App. July 18, 2014); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, BRCR2013-00983, 2014 WL 6601958,
at *5 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Nov. 10, 2014).
6
See, e.g., Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 59, 67; Pal, 2015 WL 7253650 at *4; Dering v. State,
465 S.W.3d 668, 671 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.).
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publicity threatens to challenge a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Part
II of this article details the pattern among lower courts to disregard social
media evidence that defendants offer in support of their motions. This part
delineates three reasons for dismissing social media evidence: social media
is too recent a medium to fully understand and analyze,7 social media is not
a legitimate news source,8 and social media is opinion based.9 Part III
debunks each of the three myths that lower courts rely on when excluding
social media evidence and explains why the courts’ longstanding “totality of
circumstances” test is well suited to test whether pretrial social media
evidence threatens a defendant’s constitutional rights. This article concludes
by proving that the reluctance of courts to consider social media evidence
when deciding whether to grant a motion for a change of venue is a violation
of any defendant’s constitutional rights.

II.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

The Constitution, through the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,
guarantees every citizen a right to trial by an impartial jury in the district in
which the defendant committed the crime. 10 In some instances, the crime with
which defendant is charged creates an abundance of media attention.11 This
attention is at times so pervasive that it corrupts the ability of the defendant’s
peers to evaluate the charges impartially. As a result, the defendant may
request that a court move the trial to a different venue. A trial judge must
grant the request if, either the publicity surrounding the prosecution creates a
presumption of prejudice or voir dire reveals an inability of the court to
impanel an unbiased jury.12
The idea of the need for a change of venue to guarantee an impartial jury
dates back to 1807, before television, 24/7 news cycles, and any thought of

7

See Estes, 381 U.S. at 544, 546.
See United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 412 (3d Cir. 2016). See also Tienda v. State, 358
S.W.3d 633, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Dering 465 S.W.3d at 671; Commonwealth v. Mangel,
181 A.3d 1154, 1162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
9
See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 380 (2010); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1033
(1984); State v. Cordoba, No. F-16-001, 2017 WL 5629604, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2017).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11
See infra Part I.A.
12
See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 380; United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d 57, 59 (D. Mass.
2016); Commonwealth v. Pal, No. 207 MDA 2015, 2015 WL 7253650 at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov.
17, 2015).
8
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the internet.13 At that time, Chief Justice Marshall found that the intense
newspaper accounts and heightened public and private discussions
surrounding the Aaron Burr-Alexander Hamilton duel made it difficult to
impanel an unbiased jury for Aaron Burr’s murder trial.14 In 1878, bigamist
George Reynolds unsuccessfully argued that the court should move his trial
following intense media scrutiny about his misdeeds. 15 Chief Justice Waite
denied Reynolds’s request writing:
In these days of newspaper enterprise and universal
education, every case of public interest is almost, as a matter
of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent
people in the vicinity, and scarcely anyone can be found
among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or heard
of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion in
respect to its merits.16
From the American judicial system’s start, courts recognized the powerful
effect of an omnipresent media and the difficult task of keeping it at bay for
purposes of guaranteeing the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
Courts interpreting the issue of change of venue must strike the delicate
balance between the traditional media’s First Amendment rights and the
defendant’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Sometimes
considered the Fourth Estate,17 the press reports on matters of import,
including government actions. The media, however, is also a business, and
often this reporting is tinged with the kind of sensationalism and bias that is
guaranteed to sell. 18

13
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51
(C.C.D. Va. 1807)).
14
Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 49, 52.
15
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878).
16
Id. at 155–56.
17
See infra Part III.A. The Fourth Estate is the term given to the news as a branch of government
charged with overseeing the other three constitutional branches. See infra text accompanying note
31.
18
Today, the line between hard news and information is blurred, to the point of creating
“infotainment,” a type of reporting that is not fully objective. See, e.g., Alessandra Stanley, George
Stephanopoulos and the Line Between News and Entertainment, N.Y. TIMES, (May 15, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/16/arts/television/george-stephanopoulos-and-the-linebetween-news-and-entertainment.html; Clay Calvert, What is News?: The FCC and the New Battle
Over the Regulation of Video Releases, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 361 (2008).
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In the enjoyment of their constitutional rights, however, “[the media]
may not deprive accused persons of their right to a fair trial.”19 In deciding to
grant a change of venue in the case of a participant in the celebrated Brinks
Heist case, New York’s Second Department considered, among other things,
the local paper’s attempt to increase circulation at newsstands by carrying the
headline, “FRESHEST NEWS OF THE BRINKS CASE.”20 Such
manipulative journalism evidenced “intensive, localized, continuing and
prejudicial publicity.”21 In Sheppard v. Maxwell, a case referred as the “trial
of the century,” the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s denial of a
change of venue in light of the media’s persistent coverage of the trial and
“carnival-like atmosphere.”22
In light of the tension between the competing First and Sixth
Amendments, the Supreme Court has, in several instances, guided lower
courts faced with change of venue challenges. Beginning before television
became a household staple, and through the advent of the internet, the Court
adopted and refined the test that trial judges must apply when deciding
whether to grant defendants’ motions. This test, called the “totality of
circumstances” test, asks trial judges to employ broad considerations as to
whether newspaper, radio and television reports are so biased that there is
evidence that jurors are either actually prejudiced by the reporting or, given
the weight of negativity, a judge can presume that it would be impossible to
impanel an unbiased jury.23
Whether pretrial publicity justifies a change of venue remains in the
hands of the trial judge.24 The Supreme Court has provided constitutional
guidelines to those charged with the task. Although it has not drawn any clear
lines, the more subjective and biased news reporting may be, the more
justified a trial judge is in granting the change of venue.

19
People v. Boudin, 457 N.Y.S.2d 302, 307 (1982) (citing Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 53
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
20
Id. at 306.
21
Id.
22
384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
23
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1878); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S.
15, 18–19 (1919); United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 463 (1956); Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 727–28 (1961); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 545 (1965).
24
Estes, 381 U.S. at 535.
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A. Negative Pretrial Publicity and the Early Days of Television
The Supreme Court first took issue with the media’s ability to permeate
juror impartiality in 1919 when, in Stroud v. the United States, it found that
news articles which “printed and commented upon” the defendant’s previous
trials were sufficient to justify the exclusion of jurors in the county in which
the articles appeared.25 It was not until the mid-twentieth century, a time
when most homes were beginning to buy their first television sets, that the
Court turned serious attention to the matter. Over six years, the Court
considered four cases, Irvin v. Dowd,26 Rideau v. Louisiana,27 Estes v. State,28
and Sheppard v. Maxwell,29 which together set forth the boundaries of pretrial
publicity concerning its infringement on a defendant’s constitutional rights.
At the time the Court heard these cases, the idea of a negative press was
not novel. In Irvin, the earliest of the three cases, Justice Frankfurter noted in
his concurrence that “not a Term passes without this Court being importuned
to review convictions . . . in which substantial claims are made that a trial has
been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts.” 30 These
“claims,” to which Justice Frankfurter refers, were in large part the exception
rather than the rule, as the public revered the traditional press, thinking it an
impartial body charged with informing the public on matters of concern. 31
The Court decided these cases against the backdrop of a healthy respect for
news media. Irvin v. Dowd concerned a series of murders that took place in
Evansville, Indiana from 1954-1955.32 Police arrested Leslie Irvin, an
African American man, for the crimes and announced that he had confessed
25

251 U.S. at 18.
See generally 366 U.S. 717.
27
See generally 373 U.S. 723.
28
See generally 381 U.S. 532.
29
See generally 384 U.S. 333.
30
Irvin, 366 U.S. at 730 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
31
See infra Part III.A. The press is often referred to as the Fourth Estate, charged with checks
and balances on the other three branches of government. THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HEROWORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY 257–58 (4th ed. 1852):
26

Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder,
there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech or a
witty saying; it is a literal fact . . . Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation,
becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in law-making, in all
acts of authority.
See also Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633–34 (1975).
32
Irvin, 366 U.S. at 719.
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to the murders. What followed was a “barrage of newspaper headlines,
articles, cartoons and pictures” 33 about the defendant and the crimes,
including interviews with potential jurors who made such comments such as
“My mind is made up,” “I think he is guilty,” and “He should be hanged.” 34
According to defendant’s motion papers, the newspaper reached 95% of the
dwellings in the Indiana county of 30,000 people. 35
The trial court overruled the defendant’s motion for a change of venue. A
jury convicted the defendant of murder and sentenced him to death. 36 The
Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.37 Irvin sought a writ of
habeas corpus from the Supreme Court.38
Justice Clark wrote the unanimous opinion reversing Irvin’s conviction
based on a failure to impanel an impartial jury. 39 The Court concluded that
the jury pool’s collective view expressed during vior dire, demonstrated an
actual prejudice towards Irvin. 40 Justice Clark’s opinion centered on evidence
of the biased newspaper reports, including the coerced confession, and the

33

Id. at 725.
Id. at 727. The court illustrated the information provided in the news reports:

34

These stories revealed the details of his background, including a reference to crimes
committed when a juvenile, his convictions for arson almost 20 years previously, for
burglary and by a court-martial on AWOL charges during the war. He was accused of
being a parole violator. The headlines announced his police line-up identification, that he
faced a lie detector test, had been placed at the scene of the crime and that the six murders
were solved, but petitioner refused to confess. Finally, they announced his confession to
the six murders and the fact of his indictment for four of them in Indiana. . . . [O]n the
second day devoted to the selection of the jury, the newspapers reported that “strong
feelings, often bitter and angry, rumbled to the surface,” and that “the extent to which the
multiple murders—three in one family—have aroused feelings throughout the area was
emphasized Friday when 27 of the 35 prospective jurors questioned were excused for
holding biased pretrial opinions.” A few days later the feeling was described as “a pattern
of deep and bitter prejudice against the former pipe-fitter.” Spectator comments, as
printed by the newspapers, were “my mind is made up”; “I think he is guilty”; and “he
should be hanged.”
Id. at 725–27 (emphasis added).
35
Id. at 719, 725.
36
Id. at 718.
37
Id.
38
The Supreme Court originally denied direct review by certiorari without prejudice. Id. at 718–
19.
39
Id. at 718, 728–29.
40
Id. at 728.
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newspaper headlines that caused “a sustained excitement and fostered a
strong prejudice among the people of Gibson County.”41
In reaching its decision, the Court set a somewhat high standard for
defendants to meet in support of a change of venue. Recognizing that “in
these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of
communication . . . scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will
not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the
case. . . . ”42 and the Court held that “[i]t is not required . . . that jurors be
totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.” 43 The test, therefore, is not
whether a potential juror has learned of the case through negative reporting,
but instead, whether the juror “can lay aside his impression or opinion and
render a verdict based on the evidence presented by the court.”44 Absent proof
of the “actual existence” of a juror’s ability to remain impartial, the trial court
need not grant defendant’s request. According to Irvin, a trial court must
grant the defendant’s motion for change of venue upon proof that media
reports caused actual prejudice among venirepersons. 45 A reviewing court
cannot set aside the decision absent proof of manifest error on the part of the
judge hearing the motion. 46
Four years after Irvin, the Court considered the case of Wilbert Rideau. 47
Rideau robbed a bank in Lake Charles, Louisiana, and took three employees
hostage, killing one.48 After his arrest, officers took him to a parish jail where
the county sheriff interviewed him for twenty minutes. 49 The sheriff’s office
videotaped the interview.50
During the taped interrogation, Rideau confessed to the bank robbery,
kidnapping, and murder.51 The taped confession made its way to a local
television station, which broadcast the image of “Rideau in jail, flanked by
the sheriff and two state troopers, admitting in detail the commission of the
robbery, kidnapping, and murder, in response to leading questions by the
41

Id. at 726.
Id. at 722.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 723.
45
Id. at 728.
46
Id. at 723.
47
See generally Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
48
Id. at 723–24.
49
Id. at 724.
50
Id.
51
Id.
42
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sheriff.” 52 By the time the television station aired the taped confession for
the third time, it had reached 64% of the residents in the parish from which
the court would draw its jury pool.53
Upon appointment of counsel, Rideau’s lawyers promptly filed a motion
for change of venue. 54 The court denied the motion, and a parish court
convicted Rideau, sentencing him to death. 55 The Supreme Court of
Louisiana affirmed the conviction.56 Rideau appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.57
The Rideau v. Louisiana United States Supreme Court opinion, which
reads as a stern rebuke to the sheriff’s office, the television station, and the
trial court, reversed Rideau’s conviction.58 Justice Stewart, who wrote for the

52

Id. at 725. Footnote Two reads:

The Supreme Court of Louisiana summarized the event as follows: “[O]n the morning of
February 17, 1961, the defendant was interviewed by the sheriff, and the entire interview
was filmed (with a soundtrack) and shown to the audience of television station KPLCTV on three occasions. The showings occurred prior to the arraignment of a defendant
on the murder charge. In this interview, the accused admitted his part in the crime for
which he was later indicted [sic].”
Id. at n.2.
53
The Court described the number of viewers reached:
Some 24,000 people in the community saw and heard it on television. The sound film
was again shown on television the next day to an estimated audience of 53,000 people.
The following day the film was again broadcast by the same television station, and this
time approximately 29,000 people saw and heard the “interview” on their television sets.
At the time of the broadcast, Calcasieu Parish has a population of approximately 150,000
people.
Id. at 724.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 724–25.
56
Id. at 725.
57
Id.
58
Id. Explaining the Court’s final thoughts:
The record shows that such a thing as this never took place before in Calcasieu Parish,
Louisiana. Whether it has occurred elsewhere, we do not know. But we do not hesitate
to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire
examination of the members of the jury, that due process of law, in this case, required a
trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not seen and heard
Rideau’s televised “interview.” Due process of law, preserved for all by our
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majority, called the taped confession in a sheriff’s office, without the
presence of counsel, a “kangaroo court proceeding” which allowed
prospective jurors to reach an opinion before the defendant could receive due
process in a court of law.59 In this instance, the Court found that because the
twenty-minute broadcast reached such a large population of the potential jury
pool, it was likely that an examination of the voir dire would show
prejudice. 60 In such an instance, prejudice is presumed. 61
The Rideau Court extended the circumstances upon which a trial court
must grant a change of venue. Whereas Irvin demanded proof of actual
prejudice—a showing that media reports infected the particular
venireperson’s impartiality—Rideau allowed judges to grant a defendant’s
change of venue motion and allowed a defendant to presume that the media
surrounding the case makes it impossible to assemble an impartial jury.
Rideau permits judges to grant a change of venue motion even before polling
members of the jury pool. The Court looked to proof of both actual and
presumed evidence in the cases that followed Rideau. In the mid-1960s, with
television becoming a household item, the Court considered a pair of cases
“obtained in a trial atmosphere that [were] utterly corrupted by press
coverage.”62 In 1965, the Court heard Estes v. Texas.63 The issue in Estes was
similar to Rideau. The Court considered whether televised news stories could
prejudice a jury pool to the extent that it prohibited a court from impaneling
an impartial jury.64
Billy Sol Estes was a well-known Texas oilman and a close friend of then
Vice President Lyndon Johnson.65 The State charged Estes with a fraud
scheme concerning the Texas ammonia business.66 His ties to a high-ranking

Constitution, commands that no such practice as that disclosed by this record shall send
any accused to his death.
Id. at 727.
59
Id. at 726.
60
See id. at 727.
61
See, e.g., id.
62
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 380 (2010) (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S.
794, 798 (1975)) (Justice Ginsburg in Skilling reflecting on Estes and Sheppard).
63
381 U.S. 532 (1965).
64
Id. at 544.
65
Michael Carlson, Billie Sole Estes obituary, THE GUARDIAN (May 17, 2013), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/17/billie-sol-estes.
66
Estes, 381 U.S. at 534 n.1.
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government official, combined with the breadth of his alleged crime, made
for a media frenzy and national news. 67
The State allowed both television and still photography cameras at Estes’
pretrial hearing.68 The result was overwhelming. “At least 12 cameramen
were engaged in the courtroom throughout the hearing taking motion and still
pictures and televising the proceedings. Cables and wires were snaked across
the courtroom floor. . . .”69 The State also allowed cameras at Estes’ trial, but
the state took precaution to limit the effects of their presence by assembling
a small filming booth in the back of the courtroom painted to blend in with
its surroundings.70 Estes’ challenged his conviction on constitutional
grounds, arguing that the presence of media at his pretrial hearing violated
his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 71 The Estes Court
considered the presence of cameras in the courtroom, as opposed to the
pretrial media with which Irvin and Rideau were concerned. While the media
timeline was different, the Court’s analysis was the same. 72
In reaching its 5-4 decision, the Court focused on then-recent
technological advances of the broadcast medium. 73 “At the outset,” Justice
Clark wrote, “the notion should be dispelled that telecasting is dangerous
because it is new.” 74 In this instance, however, the presence of the television
medium was a distraction to everyone in the courtroom. For the defendant,
the presence of television is “a form of mental—if not physical—harassment,
resembling a police line-up or the third degree.” 75 For jurors, the presence of

67

Id. at 535.
Id.
69
Id. at 536. The Court described the layout of the courtroom:
68

A booth had been constructed at the back of the courtroom which was painted to blend
with the permanent structure of the room. It had an aperture to allow the lens of the
cameras an open view of the courtroom. All television cameras and newsreel
photographers were restricted to the area of the booth when shooting film or telecasting.
Id. at 537.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 535.
72
Id. at 544.
73
Id. at 549–52.
74
Id. at 541. The Court noted that forty-five states and the federal rules ban television in the
courtroom. Id. at 544.
75
Id. at 549.
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television places on them the added burden of knowing “friends and
neighbors have their eyes on them.” 76
The Estes Court reviewed the trial court’s decision to deny the
defendant’s change of venue motion.77 The Court found that the broadcasting
that happened during the pretrial hearing tainted the jury pool to such a degree
that a trial court should have presumed that prejudice had occurred to the
extent that it could never impanel an impartial jury. 78 The Majority seemed
less concerned with the cameras during the defendant’s trial, which were
hidden or otherwise obscured. Upon concluding presumed prejudice existed,
the Court concluded there was no need to also find proof of actual prejudice. 79
Despite the majority’s tacit sanction of the cameras during defendant’s
trial (as opposed to the pretrial hearing), the Court’s dissenters read the ruling
to mean that televisions in a courtroom are per se unconstitutional. Justice
Stewart, writing for the dissent, 80 noted that while “the introduction of
television is . . . an extremely unwise policy . . . [i]t invites many
constitutional risks, and it detracts from the inherent dignity of a courtroom,”
there are instances where its presence can rest within constitutional
boundaries. 81
The Court took a more nuanced approach to the presence of televisions
in the courtroom when it decided Sheppard v. Maxwell.82 The State of Ohio
charged Dr. Samuel Sheppard with the murder of his then-pregnant wife,
Marilyn.83 The respected neurosurgeon claimed that he was asleep on a
daybed on the first floor of his home while Marilyn was bludgeoned
upstairs.84 Perhaps, because of the doctor’s status, the media clung to both
the pretrial and trial activities. Television, newspaper, and radio reports
dubbed Dr. Sheppard’s case “the trial of the century.” 85

76

Id. at 545.
Id. at 532.
78
Id. at 550–51.
79
Id. at 542.
80
Justices Steward, Black, Brennan, and White joined the dissent. Id. at 601.
81
Id. at 601 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
82
See generally 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
83
Id. at 335.
84
Id. at 336.
85
Kenneth Jost, Cameras in the Courtroom: Should TV be allowed in federal courts?, 21 CQ
RESEARCHER 25, 34 (2011); It is worth noting that there was a second “trial of the century,” the
trial of O.J. Simpson, a famous ex-football player turned sportscaster and actor, who was charged
with killing his ex-wife and her friend in 1994. Nell Henderson & Marc Fisher, O.J. Simpson
77
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The trial was held in Bay Village, Ohio, a small suburb of Cleveland. 86
From the start, the media portrayed Sheppard in a negative light, publishing
front-page editorials about his refusal to cooperate in the investigation and
leading with editorials about Dr. Sheppard including, “[S]omebody is getting
away with murder.”87 To accommodate spectators, the State held the pretrial
hearings in a school gym. 88 At trial, the State set up the courtroom to meet
the needs of television and news reporters.89
The trial court convicted Sheppard of second-degree murder.90 Sheppard
sought habeas relief from the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio, which voided the conviction. 91 The government appealed, and the
Sixth Circuit reversed. 92 Sheppard then appealed to the Supreme Court which
reversed and remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit, holding that the
trial judge failed “to protect Sheppard sufficiently from the massive,
pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution.” 93

Acquitted, WASH. P OST (October 3, 1995) https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/
10/03/oj-simpson-acquitted/3307d174-cbe2-46c5-80c6-0d0b90a0d889/?noredirecton&utm_term=.959d162f40f4. A “white Bronco chase,” in which Simpson engaged the police in a
slow-speed chase along the California freeways, was nationally televised for approximately three
hours. O.J. Simpson white Bronco chase: How it Happened, Minute by Minute, THE LOS ANGELES
TIMES (Jun. 17, 2014) https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-oj-simpson-white-broncochase-20140617-story.html. The subsequent trial in 1995 was televised daily. Nell Henderson &
Marc Fisher, O.J. Simpson Acquitted, WASH. P OST (October 3, 1995) (“The decision brings to a
halt ‘the trial of the century’.”).
86
Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 341.
87
Id. at 339. Other headlines reported that Sheppard had refused to take a lie detector test and
had refused to be injected with truth serum. Id. Articles reported that Sheppard had a motive to kill
his wife because he was having an affair. Id. at 340.
88
Id. at 339. The hearing was created by the local Coroner. Id. The Coroner presided over the
inquest, along with the County Prosecutor as his advisor. Id. A long table was set up in the front of
the room to accommodate the press; there were several hundred spectators. Id. Sheppard’s counsel
was allowed to be present during the inquest, but his counsel was not allowed to participate. Id. at
340. In fact, when Sheppard’s counsel did attempt to participate, the Coroner had him removed from
the inquest, receiving cheers from the crowd. Id. The inquest lasted five and a half hours. Id.
89
Id. at 342–43. A table, which ran the length of the courtroom, was set up behind the counsel
table specifically for reporters. Id. at 343. Also, the first three and a half rows in the courtroom were
reserved for television and newspaper reporters. Id. Only the second half of the fourth row was
reserved for Sheppard’s family. Id.
90
Id. at 335.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 335, 363.
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The Sheppard Court evaluated the prejudice of a carnival-like atmosphere
that lasted the duration of Sheppard’s criminal case. 94 Given the high
probability that the extraordinary media attention swayed most members of
the community, the Court did not concern itself with learning of individual
bias during voir dire.95 Instead, it evaluated whether, based on the totality of
circumstances, presumed prejudice existed. 96 The extensive newspaper,
radio, and television coverage that the case received, the fact that the
courtroom was arranged to maximize television recording, and that the trial
court did not sequester jurors, thereby exposing them to television, radio, and
other news reports at the same time they were deciding the case, led the Court
to find that the judge’s failure to grant a change of venue violated Sheppard’s
constitutional right to a fair trial, reversing and remanding his case. 97
After 1966, the issue of whether pretrial publicity justified a change of
venue lay dormant for over a decade. In the cases that followed, the Court
continued to apply Sheppard’s “totality of the circumstances” test to Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges based on motions for change of
venue. 98 The burden remained on the defendant to prove that the publicity
either caused actual prejudice, which occurs when a voir dire reveals a
community-wide sentiment against a defendant, 99 or presumed prejudice,
which happens when the news coverage has been so pervasive and prejudicial
to a defendant that a court cannot expect to find an unbiased jury pool in the
community prior to the performance of voir dire.100

B. A Formalized Totality of Circumstances Test
Despite the breadth of inquiry the totality of circumstances encouraged,
securing a change of venue remained elusive for most defendants. A trial
court judge could only grant a defendant’s motion for change of venue if he
or she either learned upon voir dire that the pretrial publicity had prejudiced
too many venirepersons or that the publicity was so manifestly prejudicial

94

Id. at 358.
Id. at 357.
96
Id. at 352.
97
Id. at 363. Much of the information reported was never brought into trial. Id.
98
Malone v. Crouse, 380 F.2d 741, 744 (10th Cir. 1967); Walker v. People, 458 P.2d 238, 239
(1969); State v. Beason, 506 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Idaho 1973).
99
Welch v. United States, 371 F.2d 287, 290 (1966).
100
Weekly v. State, 222 A.2d 781, 785–86 (Del. 1966); see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965) (finding that defendant’s due process rights were violated when his trial was televised).
95
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that the judge could only presume that it would be impossible to impanel an
impartial jury.101 The Supreme Court granted such wide latitude to reviewing
courts when making this inquiry that reviewing courts could only reverse trial
decisions upon a showing that the trial judge made a manifest error.102
The Supreme Court considered the issue of whether pre-trial publicity
bias delivered through traditional media—newspapers, television, and
radio—only four times between 1975 and 2010. In each instance, despite
widespread notoriety, a divided Court rejected the defendant’s claim. The
benches of Murphy v. Florida,103 Patton v. Yount,104 Mu’Min v. Virginia,105
and United States v. Skilling106 each acknowledged that given the state of
present-day media, it was impossible to find potential jurors who had not
been exposed to a “barrage of publicity” regarding a sensational trial.107 The
ability of jurors to set aside the media’s message, 108 the objectivity of
reporting, 109 the depth of a jury pool, 110 and the focus of media attention, 111
however, were factors in support of the judges’ rejections of defendants’
claims.
In Murphy v. Florida, the Court rejected the defendant’s petition for
habeas corpus relief despite national attention to the defendant’s previous
crimes. 112 Jack Roland Murphy113 was a notorious thief who, before his arrest
for the present offense, was nationally recognized for stealing the “Star of
101

Welch, 371 F.2d at 290; Weekly, 22 A.2d at 785–86.
See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724 (1961); Estes, 381 U.S. at 551–52.
103
421 U.S. 794, 799, 803 (1975).
104
See generally 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
105
See generally 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
106
See generally 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
107
Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798–99.
108
Id. at 800. The Court stated:
102

To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence
of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror’s
impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can
lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented
in court.
Id. (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
109
Patton, 467 U.S. at 1028–29.
110
Id. at 1028.
111
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 (1991).
112
421 U.S. 794, 795 (1975).
113
Murphy was also known as “Murph the Surf” because he was also a surfing champion. Id.
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India” sapphire from the American Museum of Natural History in New York
City,114 and for his involvement in what the national news dubbed the
“Whisky Creek Murders.”115 A Florida court convicted Murphy for breaking
and entering with intent to commit burglary. 116
The Court acknowledged that it was unlikely to find jurors unfamiliar
with a case as sensational as this one, given the state of the media. 117
However, Justice Marshall wrote that evidence of juror exposure to pre-trial
publicity, even a barrage of publicity, is insufficient “if [a] juror [is able to]
lay aside his [or her] impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the
evidence presented in court.”118 In evaluating whether the trial judge erred in
refusing a change of venue motion, the court will consider “the length to
which the trial court must go in order to select jurors who appear to be
impartial.”119 In instances where most jurors admit to some degree of
influence, the trial court may presume community-wide hostility. Seven
justices found that the totality of the circumstances supported the trial judge’s
ruling finding that only twenty of the seventy-eight potential jurors were
dismissed for prejudging the defendant, and that the remaining jurors were
not persuaded by news of Murphy’s past crimes, seven justices found that the
totality of the circumstances supported the trial judge’s ruling. 120
In Patton v. Yount, a Court by a 6-2 majority, ruled that the objective
nature of reporting that took place while the court conducted voir dire, and
the length of time that passed since the initial “barrage” four years earlier,
was sufficient to support the trial judge’s conclusion denying defendant’s

114
On October 29, 1964, Murphy, and three others, stole more than 20 gems, including the Star
of India, a 563.35-carat star sapphire, from the American Museum of Natural History in New York
City. John Rowland Murphy, BIOGRAPHY.COM, (April 2, 2014), https://www.biography.com/
people/jack-rowland-murphy-17169618. Murphy was arrested two days later. Id. Murphy’s
involvement in the robbery at the Museum of Natural History—which has been credited as “the
greatest jewel heist of the 20th century”—landed him in prison for almost two years, and also
immortalized his name in the hall of infamy. Id.
115
Two Los Angeles women were found dead, weighted down in “Whisky Creek Canal” near
Hollywood Florida. BIOGRAPHY. COM, supra note 114.
116
Murphy, 421 U.S. at 795.
117
Id. at 796.
118
Id. at 800.
119
Id. at 802–03.
120
Justice Brennan dissented. Id. at 804–08 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Burger agreed with
the result, but on procedural grounds, noting he would have otherwise overturned the ruling. Id. at
803–04 (Burger, J., concurring).
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change of venue motion.121 In 1966, Jon Yount, a high school mathematics
teacher, confessed to the gruesome killing of an 18-year-old high school
student.122 At the time, both newspapers and radios sensationalized the story,
including details of an alleged written confession.123 Due to a series of
procedural errors, both before and during the trial, the court overturned
Yount’s conviction.124 The court convened a new trial four years later.125
Yount argued that the extensive pretrial publicity surrounding his arrest
and first trial unconstitutionally prejudiced the jury pool of his second trial.
Both the Pennsylvania and U.S. Supreme Courts rejected his claim. 126 In
denying habeas relief, Justice Powell, writing for the majority of the Supreme
Court, noted that “the lapse in time [between trials] had a profound effect on
the community and, more important[ly], on the jury, in softening or effacing
opinion.”127 Contemporary news reports, of which there were few, were
descriptive rather than biased.128 Consequently, voir dire revealed that the
jurors at the second trial lacked any “prior or present fixed opinion.” 129 In
addition, the deep jury pool provided a sufficient dilution of fixed ideas. 130 In

467 U.S. 1025, 1025 (1984). Justice Marshall had recused himself. Id. “That time soothes
and erases is a perfectly natural phenomenon, familiar to all.” Id. at 1034.
122
Id. at 1027.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1032.
125
Id. In Yount’s first trial he was convicted of first-degree murder and rape and sentenced to
life imprisonment. Id. at 1027. However, the appeals court found that police had given Yount
inadequate notice of his right to an attorney under Miranda, so the appeals court remanded Yount’s
case for a new trial. Id. The second trial court suppressed Yount’s written confession to the murder,
as well as part of his oral confession taken while he was in custody. Id. Yount was convicted of
first-degree murder a second time. Id. at 1028. Yount argued that he was prejudiced during the
second trial because the potential jurors had already heard about his confession and prior conviction
from the first trial due to media reports. Id.
126
Commonwealth v. Yount, 256 A.2d 464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970); see also
Commonwealth v. Yount, 314 A.2d 242 (1974); Yount v. Patton, 537 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Pa. 1982),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 710 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984), aff’d, 744
F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1984).
127
Yount, 467 U.S. at 1033 (Stevens, J dissenting) (Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan,
took issue with the majority’s characterization of the news articles, noting they were extremely
detailed).
128
Id. at 1027–28.
129
Id. at 1028.
130
The jury pool consisted of 163 venirepersons. Id. at 1029. 292 venirepersons were initially
chosen. Id. at 1027. Of those, 125 were dismissed for being improperly chosen, and four were
dismissed for cause; leaving 163. Id. 1029 n.2.
121

9 TENZER (DO NOT DELETE)

6/18/2019 11:31 AM

2019]SOCIAL MEDIA, VENUE, AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 437
reaching its conclusion, the Court reaffirmed the need for great deference to
the trial judge on the issue. 131
In Mu’Min v. Virginia, the Court again looked at the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the pretrial publicity of a convict who murdered
a woman while out on work detail. 132 While the event garnered significant
news coverage, the media focused much of its aim at the criminal justice
system rather than the defendant.133 By a vote of 6-3, the Court denied
Mu’Min’s appeal.134 Justice Rehnquist distinguished the circumstances of
this case from previous cases, noting that it lacked “the wave of public
passion” against the defendant that occurred in Irvin,135 and that the jurors
lacked the fixed ideas expressed about Mu’Min’s guilt that jurors in Patton
v. Yount had expressed.136 In this instance, the defendant was able to show
actual prejudice against the system that granted his work detail, but such a
showing did not demonstrate actual prejudice against him, despite eight of
the twelve jurors admitting they had heard about the case before trial.137
The most recent case in which the Court considered the issue of pretrial
publicity and its effects on constitutional rights, came in 2010, in Skilling v.
United States.138 Skilling represents the first—and to date the only—case
considering pretrial publicity against the backdrop of the internet. The Court
was not concerned with the internet’s power to easily reach the desks of
131
Id. at 1038. There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption of correctness to the
trial court’s resolution of these questions. Id. First, the determination has been made only after an
often-extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to identify biased veniremen. Id. It is fair
to assume that the method we have relied on since the beginning, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 49, 51 (Va. Cir. 1807), usually identifies bias. Id. Second, the determination is essentially one
of credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor. As we have said on numerous occasions, the
trial court’s resolution of such questions is entitled, even on direct appeal, to “special deference.”
Id.; see also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434–35 (1983); see, e.g., Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500 (1984). The respect paid such findings in a habeas
proceeding certainly should be no less. Id.
132
500 U.S. 415, 417 (1991).
133
Id. at 429.
134
Id. at 421–22.
135
Id. at 429 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961)).
136
Id. at 430 (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984)).
137
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, criticized the majority for failing to ask the empaneled jurors
exactly what they had learned from the pretrial publicity. See id. at 438 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).”The question before us is whether, in light of the charged atmosphere that surrounded
this case, the trial court was constitutionally obliged to ask the eight jurors who admitted exposure
to pretrial publicity to identify precisely what they had read, seen, or heard.” Id.
138
See generally 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
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jurors, relegating it to a series of footnoted cites quoting an article concerning
Skilling’s alleged crimes.139
Jeffrey Skilling was the CEO of Enron, which was, at the time, “the
seventh highest-revenue-grossing company in America.”140 With Skilling at
the head, the company “crashed into bankruptcy,” 141 and the federal
government charged him with several counts of fraud, insider trading, and
other crimes.142 As a consequence of his actions, thousands of employees lost
both their jobs and their pensions, and countless more investors lost
significant investment and retirement funds. 143 The news was of such vital
import to the United States and its economy that every major news
organization carried stories on the matter for over two years.144
Relying heavily on the precedent announced in Rideau, Estes, and
Sheppard, the majority announced a more formalized iteration of its “totality
of circumstances” test. The Court stated that any appellate courts considering
constitutional infringement on individual rights as a consequence of pretrial
publicity should weigh four factors: (1) the size and character of the
community in which the crime occurred; (2) whether the stories contained
confessions of other “prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers
could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight;” (3) the time that
elapsed between initial reporting of the crime and the trial; and (4) the fact
that the jury acquitted the defendant of some of the charged offenses. 145

139

Id. at 370 n. 3.
Id. at 367. Enron was major conglomerate with revenues over $101 billion dollars. Wrestling
with Reform: Financial Scandals and the Legislation They Inspired, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION: HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/wwr/
wwr06a-scandals-enron.php. (last visited Mar. 6, 2019).
141
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 367.
142
Id. at 369. Conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud,
making false representations to Enron’s auditors, and insider trading. Id. Fastow, Enron’s CFO;
Lay, Enron’s founder; Causey, Enron’s former CAO; and dozens of others were prosecuted for this
scandal. Id. at 368–69.
143
See id. at 375–76.
144
Compare date of Richard A. Oppel, Jr., & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron’s Collapse: The
Overview; Enron Collapses as Suitor Cancel’s Plans for Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2001)
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/29/business/enron-s-collapse-the-overview-enron-collapses-assuitor-cancels-plans-for-merger.html. with date of David Gay Johnston, Tax Moves by Enron Said
to Mystify the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/13/business/
tax-moves-by-enron-said-to-mystify-the-irs.html.
145
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 382–83.
140
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The Court cited the fourth factor as most important.146 Concerning the
other factors, the majority concluded that the lapse of four years and the lack
of a confession, which is most damning to readers, did not support the
defendant’s motion. 147 Finally, because the trial took place in Houston, “the
fourth most populous city in the nation,” the jury pool was both large and
diverse enough to ensure at least twelve impartial jurors.148
Justice Sotomayor took exception to the majority opinion.149 Reviewing
the body of precedent on the matter, Justice Sotomayor noted that the
“totality of circumstances test” is case specific and the generic test that the
majority announced should give way to a more particularized scrutiny. 150
“The devastating impact of Enron’s collapse and the relentless media
coverage demanded exceptional care on the part of the District Court to
ensure the seating of an impartial jury.” 151
Although fractured in its conclusion, all nine members of the Court
agreed that a reviewing court must apply the totality of circumstances test
when evaluating whether pretrial publicity justifies a change of venue.
Skilling provided clear guidelines to frequent change of venue motions that
followed.152 Post-Skilling a court may consider a range of factors, including
those enunciated in Skilling. In reviewing the decision, an appellate court can
set aside the trial court’s decision only upon a finding of manifest effort.153

III. LOWER COURTS’ DISINTEREST IN PRETRIAL SOCIAL MEDIA
PUBLICITY
For the past few years, defendants filing change of venue motions have
included social media posts in their basket of adverse pretrial publicity

Id. at 383. Justice Ginsburg cited it as “of prime significance.” Id.
Id. at 382–83.
148
Id. at 382. The court contrasted this with the 150,000 residents living in Calcasieu Parish at
the time Rideau was tried. Id.
149
See id. at 440 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
150
Id. at 439.
151
Id. at 447. Justice Sotomayor agreed that it was hard to conclude Skilling received a fair trial
in light of the publicity surrounding the case citing the movie and a book that followed. Id. at 431
n.3, 442 n.8, 455 n.17.
152
See, e.g., Luong v. State, 199 So. 3d 139, 146 (Ala. 2014); State v. Hadden, 271 P.3d 1227,
1235 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012); Commonwealth v. Toolan, 951 N.E.2d 903, 913–14 (Mass. 2011);
State v. Kingman, 264 P.3d 1104, 1110 (Mo. 2011).
153
See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 726 (1961); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965).
146
147

9 TENZER (DO NOT DELETE)

440

6/18/2019 11:31 AM

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2

proof. 154 Defendants are justified in their claim, in light of continually
growing empirical findings on the influence that social media posts have on
forming personal opinions. 155 To date, however, many courts have chosen to
place evidence of unfavorable social media outside the bundle of pretrial
publicity when they weigh choosing to grant or deny change of venue
motions.156 The reluctance to value negative Facebook, Twitter, Instagram
posts, and the like, reflect a greater reluctance on the part of courts to apply
traditional constitutionally-defining tests to new media problems.
In Dering v. State, a Texas appellate court refused to consider negative
social media postings in support of the defendant’s motion for a change of
venue. 157 The victim’s relatives created a Facebook memorial page that
negatively implicated the defendant. Despite proof that many members of the
small community read the page, the court rejected the social media
evidence. 158 The court cited two general concerns with the authentication of
Facebook: (1) that there was no way of knowing whether the proliferation of
negative posts came from one person who created several different profiles
(suggesting a small number of persons in the community evincing hostility
towards the defendant); and (2) persons viewing a profile had no way of
knowing whether the profile was real or not. 159 Consequently, the court did
not include Facebook posts in its totality of circumstances review.
In 2015, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania heard Commonwealth v. Pal,
a case of first impression for the court.160 Pal lured his friend Frank Bonacci

154

See, e.g., United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d 57, 60 (D. Mass. 2016) (Twitter and
Facebook posts); Commonwealth v. Pal, No. 207 MDA 2015, 2015 WL 7253650, at *4 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2015) (In Memoriam Facebook page); Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.––
Eastland 2015, no pet.) (Facebook posts); Pittman v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-CA-000124, 2014
WL 3548250, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014) (“social media outlets”).
155
See In re Dan Farr Prods., 874 F.3d 590, 593 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing trial court’s conclusion
that social media influenced potential jurors’ opinion of the case); Mark J. Feaster, Jr. Blogging and
the Political Case: The Practice and Ethics of Using Social Media to Shape Public Opinion in
Anticipation of High-Profile Litigation, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1013, 1030 (2016) (“Social media
platforms, like blogs, are particularly adept at influencing public opinion”); Thaddeus Hoffmeister,
Google, Gadgets and Guilt: Juror Misconduct in the Digital Age, 83 COL. L. REV. 409, 409 (2012).
156
See, e.g., Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 67; Pal, 2015 WL 7253650, at *4; Dering, 465
S.W.3d at 671.
157
465 S.W.3d at 668.
158
Id. at 670.
159
Id. at 671.
160
2015 WL 7253650.
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to take a ride with him and a third friend, Jason Dominick. 161 The trip ended
when Dominick shot Bonacci in the head.162 The incident happened in the
small county of Lackawanna, Pennsylvania, where all three parties lived. 163
Following the incident, the community shared in a tremendous
outpouring of emotion. Bonacci’s family created a Facebook memorial page
dedicated to Bonacci’s death.164 Websites became forums for both love and
outrage. Pal and Dominick were vilified in the posts, which reached a large
segment of the small community.165
At trial, Pal introduced evidence that almost every person called to sit on
the jury had either read news accounts, spoke about, or heard of Pal’s
involvement in the crime. 166 Much of this information was culled from social
media sites. 167 Despite this, the trial judge rejected Pal’s motion, and a jury
convicted him of murder.168 Pal appealed arguing, among other things, that
the court violated Pal’s due process rights in denying his motion. 169
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania considered
“[w]hether . . . the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a
change of venue/venire in light of the inflammatory and widespread pretrial
publicity, . . . particularly [because of] the social media[,] including a
Facebook page dedicated to the victim.”170 The appellate court excluded the
social media posts from consideration as to whether the pretrial publicity in
the case so affected the impaneled jurors as to render them unable to reach a

161

Id. at *1.
Id.
163
See Id. At the time of the crime, the population of Lackawana County was 21,000. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, Lackawanna County, PA, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/
lackawannacountypennsylvania/PST045218#PST045218 (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
164
Pal, 2015 WL 7253650, at *3–4.
165
Id.
166
98 out of 101 potential jurors. Id. at *2.
167
Id.
168
Id. at *3.
169
Id. at *4.
170
Id. at *3. Here, Appellant argued that the media coverage in newspapers, television, internet
media, relevant Facebook pages, and websites devoted to the Bonacci murder was inflammatory,
pervasive, and undeniably prejudicial. Id. at *4. Appellant argued that in addition to conventional
media coverage of the murder and trial, the social media generated by the victim’s family, in
particular, was “highly emotionally-charged, moving, sensationalistic, pervasive, accessible to and
accessed by literally thousands and thousands of viewers in the area, slanted toward [Appellant’s]
conviction, and ultimately presumptively prejudicial to his right to a fair trial by a fair and impartial
jury.” Id.
162
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fair and unbiased conclusion.171 Applying the “totality of circumstances test”
to the conventional news media reports, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
concluded that the traditional media publicity surrounding the case did not
constitutionally harm the defendant. 172 It cited the fact that at least 22% of
those considered for jury duty said during voir dire that they were not
impacted by what they read. 173
An Ohio court similarly rejected the notion that inflammatory Facebook
In Memoriam pages vilifying the defendant were sufficiently prejudicial. 174
In State v. Cordoba, an Ohio appellate court rejected the defendant’s claim
for a change of venue when he supplied the inflammatory Facebook posts
accompanied with primarily objective news reports of the crime. 175 The State
charged the defendant with involuntary manslaughter for shooting a good
Samaritan, former U.S. Marine Josh McJilton, who had come between the
defendant and his wife during a fight. 176 The crime took place in the small
town of Wauseon, Ohio, population 7,342.177 Family and friends created a
Facebook site, “Remembering Josh McJilton.”178 Despite labeling the
comments to the articles on the Facebook page as “full of enmity and
contempt, displaying a desire for complete vengeance,” the court was
unwilling to subject social media posts to the Court’s Skilling test.179
171

The court explained its rationale:

[E]ven if social media constituted pretrial publicity for the purposes of a change of venue
request, Appellant still did not establish that a change of venue was required because the
information from social media was not ‘so extensive, sustained, and pervasive that the
community must be deemed to have been saturated with it.
Id. at *5 (quoting Comm. v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519, 529 (Pa. 2003)).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
State v. Cordoba, No. F–16–001, 2017 WL 5629604, *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2017).
175
Id. at *2–3.
176
Id. at *1–2. Alexis Means, Veteran gunned down trying to help woman, 13ABC, Apr 27,
2015, https://www.13abc.com/home/headlines/A-former-marine-is-gunned-down-trying-to-helpsomeone—301481861.html.
177
US
CENSUS
BUREAU,
Wauseon,
Ohio,
https://www.census.gov/searchresults.html?q=wauseon%2C+ohio&page=1&stateGeo=none&searchtype=web&cssp=SERP (last
visited Jan. 3, 2019).
178
Remembering Josh McJilton, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/search/top/
?q=Remembering%20Josh%20McJilton&epa=SEARCH_BOX (removed after Jan. 3, 2019); see
also David Coehrs, Attorney Says Fair County Trial Impossible, SWANTON ENTERPRISE (July 20,
2015), https://www.swantonenterprise.com/news/388/cordoba-wants-change-of-venue.
179
Cordoba, 2017 WL 5629604, at *2–3.
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Federal courts are equally unwilling to consider social media posts as
sufficient to justify changes of venue, even in the most notorious of cases.
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the Boston Bomber, faced court reluctance when he
relied on social media to support a change of venue.180 Tsarnaev’s attorneys
sought to move his trial from Boston to Washington, D.C. based on bias
generated by traditional and social media coverage. 181 The court dismissed
any negative social media coverage, even social media in which potential
jurors participated.182 Simply “friending” or “liking” a post, according to the
Tsarnaev court did not translate into bias.183 The court ignored any
demonstrated influence on persons engaged in social media. 184
As recently as November 2018, a trial court, unwilling to grant a change
of venue based on social media postings, reversed its position upon proof of
one negative newspaper article. 185 The State of Indiana, Allen County,
charged Amber Garrett with felony neglect for the death of her two-year-old
son, who was beaten by his caregiver. 186 Garrett’s attorney originally moved
for a change of venue based, in large part, on the pretrial publicity that arose

180

United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d 57, 58 (D. Mass. 2016); see also In re Tsarnaev,
780 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2015).
181
Tsarnaev focused on media coverage about the anniversary of the bombing, articles about
the 2015 Marathon itself, and publicity about the victims. 157 F. Supp. 3d at 60. There was heavy
coverage about the anniversary of the event and the Marathon itself; the coverage was international.
Id. About 1,000 media credentials were issued to over 80 news organizations. Id. at 61. Coverage
could be found in the newspaper, on television, and over the internet. Id. The court noted the
multitude of reported statements:
Both local and national media reported on statements of victims’ family members, elected
officials, religious leaders, and other organizations opposing the imposition of the death
penalty for the defendant’s crimes. For example, during the penalty phase of the trial, the
parents of Martin Richard, the eight-year-old boy killed by the bomb placed by the
defendant, urged the prosecution not to pursue imposition of the death penalty in a letter
published on the front page of the Boston Globe.
Id. at 62.
182
Id. at 67.
183
See 780 F.3d at 28.
184
Id. at 18. The government conducted an analysis, which assumed that each juror’s Facebook
“friend” generated one case related “story” per day. Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 67. For example,
12 jurors each with 12 friends equals 144 case-related stories per day.
185
Matthew Leblanc, Judge: Jurors From Outside County Will Hear Neglect Case In 2-YearOld’s Death, J. GAZETTE (Nov. 1, 2018), http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/courts/
20181101/judge-jurors-from-outside-county-will-hear-neglect-case-in-2-year-olds-death.
186
Id.
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from a Facebook page dedicated to the victim, and chalk messages that
activists wrote outside the courtroom including “Charge Amber With
Murder.”187 The Court refused to grant the change of venue. 188 Garrett’s
attorney, John Bohdan, sought a change of venue in the case in February, and
Allen Superior Court Judge Fran Gull rejected it in June, saying Bohdan had
not shown that pretrial publicity would potentially bias jurors in the case. 189
Following one newspaper article, which summarized a release of the
documents relating to the case, Judge Gull, changed her mind. 190
Civil cases have wrestled with this issue, and similarly dismissed the
relevance of social media to support a change of venue. 191 In In re Dan Farr
Productions, the Ninth Circuit considered whether an abundance of
opinionated Facebook and Twitter posts about an infringement case
supported defendant’s motion for a change of venue under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 192 The court dismissed the vast number of posts as indicia
of bias among jurors and went a step further concluding that there was no
causal link between posts and juror bias.193
The unwillingness of courts to consider evidence of bias from Facebook,
Twitter, and other social media in the totality of the circumstances test,
reflects an unwillingness by courts to recognize social media as a medium

187

Matthew Leblanc, Judge, Hears From Malakai Supporters, J. Gazette (May 23, 2018), http:/
/www.journalgazette.net/news/local/courts/20180523/judge-hears-from-malakai-supporters; see
also Jamie Duffy, Report Sheds Light On Death Of 2-Year-Old Mother, Boyfriend Charged In Fatal
Beating Of Young Boy, J. Gazette (Oct. 28, 2018), http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/policefire/20181028/report-sheds-light-on-death-of-2-year-old; Jamie Duffy, 2-Year-Old’s Family Says
Authorities Failed Them, J. Gazette (Dec. 9, 2017), http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/
police-fire/20171209/2-year-olds-family-says-authoritiesfailed-them; Leblanc, supra note 185.
188
Leblanc, supra note 187.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
As recently as 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue in Dietz v. Bouldin, ruling
that a civil jury may be recalled after dismissal as long as its impartiality has not been compromised.
136 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 (2016). On behalf of the Court, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote, “Immediately
after discharge, a juror could text something about the case to a spouse, research an aspect of the
evidence on Google, or read reactions to a verdict on Twitter. Prejudice can come through a whisper
or a byte.” Id.
192
874 F.3d 590, 591 (9th Cir. 2017).
193
Id. at 593–94. The Ninth Circuit held that even though the petitioner had 5,200 Twitter
followers, the convention had more than 30,000 Twitter followers, and there were more than
200,000 media articles concerning the case; the court found that there was no causal link between
the number of posts and potential bias among San Diego jurors. Id.
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akin to the traditional media of newspapers, radio, and television when
deciding change of venue motions.
Rejecting social media bias in calculating the effect of pretrial publicity—
much like traditional media—denies defendants their constitutional right to
a fair trial. As this next section explains, social media is merely another form
of media. Courts refusing to calculate social media pre-trial publicity in their
decisions of whether to grant a change of venue fail to provide defendants
with a full and meaningful review, thereby, violating their constitutional
rights.

IV. THE CONSTITUTION DEMANDS THAT COURTS CONSIDER
PRETRIAL SOCIAL MEDIA PUBLICITY
Social media is just another form of communication. Its potential to reach
mass audiences, coupled with its potential to persuade, demand that courts
include social media in its group of media scrutinized for purposes of
deciding whether pretrial publicity warrants a change of venue. To date,
courts have discounted social media content because it is too new, 194 lacks
legitimacy, 195 or is opinionized rather than objective. 196 Quite the contrary,
social media is more established than was television when courts began to
scrutinize broadcasts for pretrial publicity. The medium has become an
integral part of communication, used by governments and heads of state to
communicate matters of import, and by traditional journalists to share their
stories. While social media is, to a degree, filled with opinions and thoughts,
those opinions take on the same quality as the biased news reports that courts
ruled were persuasive enough to justify changes of venue. Social media
presents information in much the same way as does “traditional news media”
comprised of newspapers, radio, and television. An exploration of their
similarities makes clear that courts must include social media evidence when
applying the totality of circumstances standard to pretrial publicity review.
Social media, while akin to “traditional news media” in so many ways,
does have a uniqueness seen by the courts who have been faced with
considering the newest medium. Lower courts have cited issues of

194

See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538–40 (1965).
See United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 412 (3d Cir. 2016); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d
633, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2015, no pet.); Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154, 1164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
196
See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 380 (2010); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025,
1039–40 (1984); State v. Cordoba, No. F-16-001, 2017 WL 5629604, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).
195
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authentication, interpretation, and questionable influence as reasons to
discard social media evidence. 197 The totality of circumstances, as articulated
most recently in Skilling, is flexible enough to minimize any credibility
concerns that may arise from the uniqueness of social media. 198 For these
reasons, courts must include social media evidence in their due process
review.

A. The Parallels Between Social Media and the Media of the Fourth
Estate
There is little explanation, yet some speculation, as to why courts
discount social media. Social media has not been in existence long enough
for courts to consider it part of the “traditional media.”199 The information
people read on social media is not revered in the same way as The Fourth
Estate, the term used for traditional journalism. 200 Social media is a network
of individualized opinions, not necessarily reporting. 201 A comparison of

197
See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 380; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966); Estes, 381
U.S. at 539; Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919); Browne, 834 F.3d at 412; United States
v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 2014); Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 641; Dering, 465 S.W.3d at
672; Mangel, 181 A.3d at 1164.
198
561 U.S. at 380.
199
See infra Part III.A.1.
200
See supra note 18.
201
“Fake News” is a serious issue that many social media platforms are facing today. Soroush
Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True And False News Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146 (2018). A recent
study found that falsehoods consistently dominates the truth on Twitter. Id. at 1150. The study
analyzed contested news story since Twitter’s inception in 2006; approximately 126,000 stories,
tweeted by three million users, over more than ten years. Id. at 1146. The study found that fake news
traveled faster and reached more people than accurate news stories. Id. at 1150. A false story reached
1,500 people six times quicker, on average, then a true story did. Id. at 1148. Fake news was also
seventy percent more likely to be retweeted than accurate news. Id. at 1149. However, the problem
is not limited to Twitter. “[A]ny platform that regularly amplifies engaging or provocative content
runs the risk of amplifying fake news along with it;” this includes platforms like Facebook and
YouTube. Robinson Meyer, The Grime Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study of Fake News,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/largest-studyever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104/.
From 2006 to 2016, Twitter bots, autonomous programs capable of interacting with computer
systems, amplified true stories as much as they amplified false ones. Id. However, most of the stories
were spread by human beings, rather than bots. Id. Fake news prospers “because humans, not robots,
are more likely to spread it.” Id. “The massive differences in how true and false news spreads on
Twitter cannot be explained by the presence of bots.” Id. Soroush Vosoughi, the author of the
research paper on the proliferation of spreading true and false news online, states that his paper does
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social media to traditional news media, however, reveals that they are not
different at all. Today, social media is another thread in the comprehensive
fabric of news media and, therefore, courts must include it when evaluating
pretrial publicity.

1. Social Media Is Not “Dangerous Because It Is New”202
Social media is a relatively new medium. In 1997, the first recognized
social media site, Six Degrees, allowed users to connect to other “friends”
through the internet. 203 In the mid-2000’s, social media gained Main Street
popularity; and today, a plethora of social media sites exist. Facebook,
Instagram, and Twitter are among the most popular sites, each of which
allows individuals to share with those connected to them information ranging
from status updates to personal opinions to news stories.204
The relative newness of social media has led to a healthy dose of
skepticism across the legal landscape. Courtrooms are grappling with

not determine whether the use of botnets changed around the 2016 election. Vosoughi et al., supra,
at 1146.
The stories concerning politics were the most prevalent but, unfortunately, fake news stories
affected every topic from business to entertainment. Meyer, supra. Fake news spreads quickly for
two reasons: (1) fake news seems to be more “novel” than real news, and (2) fake news evokes
much more emotion than the average tweet. Id. Fake tweets tended to elicit words associated with
surprise and disgust, while accurate tweets summoned words associated with sadness and trust. Id.
“False information online is often really novel and frequently negative.” Id. “We know those are
two features of information generally that grab our attention as human beings and that cause us to
want to share that information with others—we’re attentive to novel threats and especially attentive
to negative threats.” Id. “The key takeaway is really that content that arouses strong emotions
spreads further, faster, more deeply, and more broadly on Twitter.” Id. “This particular finding is
consistent with research in a number of different areas, including psychology and communication
studies. It’s also relatively intuitive.” Id.
“In short, social media seems to systematically amplify falsehood at the expense of the truth,
and no one—neither experts nor politicians nor tech companies—knows how to reverse that trend.
It is a dangerous moment for any system of government premised on a common public reality.” Id.
202
Estes, 381 U.S. at 541.
203
Keith Merrell, The History of Social Media: Social Networking Evolution!, HISTORY
COOPERATIVE (Jan. 10, 2019), https://historycooperative.org/the-history-of-social-media/.
204
Kevin Murnane, Which Social Media Platform is the Most Popular in the US?, FORBES
(Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinmurnane/2018/03/03/which-social-mediaplatform-is-the-most-popular-in-the-us/#68491f4e1e4e; see also STATISTA, Most Popular Mobile
Social Networking Apps in the United States as of July 2018, by Monthly Users (In Millions), https:/
/www.statista.com/statistics/248074/most-popular-us-social-networking-apps-ranked-byaudience/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
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introducing social media evidence. 205 Judges are contemplating ideal jury
instructions limiting juror social media access while sitting on trials. 206 State
courts are divided regarding the authentication of social media evidence. 207
Some courts are contemplating service of process through social media
sites.208 Social media has slipped with ease into the practice of law. Courts
use social media to establish personal jurisdiction. 209 And e-discovery is now
the norm.210 Many courts even have their own Facebook pages and Twitter
accounts.211
Courts met television with the same sense of healthy skepticism it now
applies to social media. A 1951 California court noted that the sensational
exploitation of television as a medium was likely to influence juror
neutrality.212 A 1951 Oklahoma court, contemplating cameras in the
courtroom, found it necessary to single out televisions as a new medium for
inclusion in the bundle of media granted First Amendment free speech
rights.213 Justice Clark, writing for the Court in Estes, made clear that
205

See Commonwealth v. Pal, No. 207-MDA-2015, 2015 WL 7253650, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Nov. 17, 2015); United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d 57, 60 (D. Mass. 2016); Dering v. State,
465 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.).
206
See United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 463 (1956); Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp.
3d at 67.
207
See State v. Hannah, 151 A.3d 99, 105 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (“Defendant argues
that Texas follows the Maryland approach to authentication and that [New Jersey] should adopt the
Maryland approach with its ‘three non-exclusive methods’ of authentication. We reject any
suggestion that the three methods of authentication suggested in Griffin are the only methods of
authenticating social media posts. We also reject Griffin’s suggestion that courts should apply
greater scrutiny when authenticating information from social networks.”) (citations omitted).
208
See, e.g., Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA N.A., No. 11-CIV-6608-(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012); Angela Upchurch, “Hacking” Service of Process: Using Social
Media to Provide Constitutionally Sufficient Notice of Process, 38 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV
559 (2016).
209
See, e.g., Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *1; Upchurch, supra note 208.
210
The
Importance
of
eDiscovery,
WATERFORD
TECH.,
ttps://
www.waterfordtechnologies.com/the-importance-of-ediscovery/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
211
See Andrew Henderson, The High Court and the Cocktail Party from Hell: Can Social
Media Improve Community Engagement with the Courts?, 25 J. JUDICIAL ADMIN. 175, 175 (2016);
US
Attorney
SDNY,
TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/
SDNYnews?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor (last visited Jan.
10, 2019).
212
People v. Stroble, 226 P.2d 330, 334 (Cal. 1951), aff’d sub nom., Stroble v. State of Cal.,
343 U.S. 181 (1952).
213
Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734, 739 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); see also Stahl v. State, 665 P.2d
839, 842 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
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newness is not a bar to constitutional consideration when he wrote, the notion
“should be dispelled that telecasting is dangerous because it is new.”214
In 1946 less than 0.5% of the US households had a television. 215 That
number grew to 28% by 1952216 when appellate courts first began
considering change of venue cases based on influential television
reporting.217 Social media, originating in 1997, is significantly more mature
than was television at the time courts first considered whether it could
influence a jury pool. If the length of society’s familiarity with a medium
were the determinate of jury impact, then by jurisprudential standards, it is
time for courts to acknowledge social media’s ability to both inform and
persuade.
The Court has repeatedly recognized social media’s entrenchment into
our daily lives. In Packingham v. North Carolina, a unanimous Court
acknowledged, while speaking of the First Amendment, that “the law
applies . . . to social networking sites ‘as commonly understood’—that is,
websites like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter.”218 The Court, in Trump v.

214
381 U.S. 532, 541 (1965) (the Court noted that 48 states and the federal rules ban television
in the courtroom. Id. at 544); see also Graham Zellick, Spies, Subversives, Terrorists and the British
Government: Free Speech and Other Casualties, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 773, 778 (1990) (arguing
that the newness of television aroused fear and anxiety among the British Government).
215
Mitchell Stephens, History of Television, GROLIER ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.nyu.edu/
classes/stephens/History%20of%20Television%20page.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).
216
Compare Robert Jay, Number of Television Sets in 1952, TELEVISION OBSCURITIES (Aug.
6, 2009), https://www.tvobscurities.com/2009/08/number-of-television-sets-in-1952/ (citing
16,939,100 number of television sets in 1952), with US CENSUS BUREAU, Table HH-1. Households
by Type: 1940 to Present (Nov. 2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/
families/households.html (45.54 million households in 1952).
217
See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1952) (noting potential for an
unfavorable jury based on radio and television reporting); United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296,
299 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (granting change of venue based on radio and television reports); see also
State v. Scales, 87 S.E.2d 916, 920 (N.C. 1955) (upholding motion denying change of venue based
on television and radio reports).
218
137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). North Carolina enacted a statute making it a felony for a
registered sex offender to gain access to a number of social networking websites where the offender
knows that minors can become members. Id. The issue was whether that law was allowed under the
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Id. at 1733. The Court held that the law was too broad and
a violation of the First Amendment because “to foreclose access to social media altogether is to
prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 1732.
Social media allows users to know “current events, check ads for employment, speak and listen in
the modern public square, and otherwise explore the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.”
Id.
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Hawaii,219 considered presidential tweets when interpreting the intent of a
Presidential Executive Order which banned citizens from specific countries
whose interests appeared “detrimental to the United States.” 220 In Carpenter
v. the United States, it a case concerning the use of cell phone records to
obtain personal locations, the Supreme court noted the regularity with which
the general population obtains social media updates. 221 Individuals look at
social media with more regularity than any other traditional news medium. 222
It is no surprise that, as Justice Kennedy wrote in Packingham, “Social media
offers ‘relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all
kinds.’”223

219

138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018).
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (In June 2017, President Trump
tweeted, “People, the lawyers and the courts can call it whatever they want, but I am calling it what
we need and what it is, a TRAVEL BAN!” He added: “That’s right, we need a TRAVEL BAN for
certain DANGEROUS countries, not some politically correct term that won’t help us protect our
people!” In September 2017, President Trump tweeted that “[t]he travel ban into the United States
should be far larger, tougher and more specific—but stupidly, that would not be politically correct!”
On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg.
45161 (2017), which restricted entry of certain nationals from six Muslim-majority countries. On
November 29, 2017, President Trump “retweeted” three anti-Muslim videos, entitled “Muslim
Destroys a Statue of Virgin Mary!”, “Islamist mob pushes teenage boy off roof and beats him to
death!”, and “Muslim migrant beats up Dutch boy on crutches!” The Court analyzed the President’s
actions to determine if the primary purpose of the “Travel Ban” was to disfavor Islam by preventing
its adherents from entering the country; the court answered “yes.”); see also Aguiar v. Recktenwald,
No. 3:13-2616, 2016 WL 145259, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan 1, 2016) (the Court that prisoners have no
constitutional rights to use or maintain a social media account.); Keefe v. Adams, 44 F. Supp. 3d
874, 882 (D. Minn. 2014), aff’d, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016) (the Court applied traditional First
Amendment free speech test to a case where the defendant was dismissed from nursing school based
on Facebook posts he made, which the school deemed “unbecoming of the profession and a
transgression of professional boundaries”).
221
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
222
Id.
223
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (quoting Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
844, 870 (1997)). Relying on principles of Free Speech, the Supreme Court struck down a North
Carolina Law that makes it a felony for a registered sex offender “to access a commercial social
networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become
members or to create or maintain personal Web pages.” Id. at 1733. Defendant posted on Facebook
about his positive experience in traffic court. The Court observed that “Social media ‘offers
“relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds’.” Id. at 1735. The Court
analogized this case to Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., which
regulated types of speech at Los Angeles Airport. 482 U.S. 569 (1987). “If a law prohibiting ‘all
protected expression’ at a single airport is not constitutional, it follows with even greater force that
220
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Social media is not “dangerous because it is new.” 224 Well past its
adolescence, courts on all levels have acknowledged its presence and
incorporated it into the way law is practiced.225 On a constitutional level, as
Packingham demonstrates, the Supreme Court has granted social media
constitutional protection under the First Amendment. 226 Given its maturity,
social media is no longer so new that courts are justified in excluding it from
constitutional consideration on the basis of unfamiliarity.

2. Social Media Has a Degree of Credibility
In the context of Sixth Amendment challenges to fair trials, justices
acknowledge the power of traditional media to persuade. 227 This ability, it
seems, is reserved mostly for mainstream journalists, and the medium
through which they report, who are often collectively referred to as the Fourth
Estate, for their role in serving checks and balances on the three other
branches of government.228 Social Media, in contrast, is generally considered
to lack the accountability of the Fourth Estate, perhaps because many of the
opinions and ideas expressed on social media sites like Twitter and Facebook
are not part of the organic journalism process. 229 Social media posts are not
subject to the same type of editorial scrutiny or held to the same verification
process as are articles appearing in traditional media outlets. 230 Singling out

the State may not enact this complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites
integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture.” Packingham, 137 S. Ct at 1738.
224
Estes v. Tex., 381 U.S. 532, 541 (1965).
225
Id.
226
See also Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2017) (overruling fire
department’s regulation on firefighters’ social media use, since social media posts are protected
speech); United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 738 (10th Cir. 2015) (government must prove
social media posts are intended to be threatening in order to suppress defendant’s First Amendment
rights).
227
See In re Dan Farr Prods., 874 F.3d 590, 591 (9th Cir. 2017). The traditional news media
includes television, radio, and newspaper. See, e.g., Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 5 v. Prof’l
Janitorial Serv. of Hous., Inc., 415 S.W.3d 387, 390 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.)
(traditional news outlets include newspaper articles, television, and radio broadcasts).
228
Kathy Gill, What is the Fourth Estate?, THOUGHT CO. (updated Jan. 3, 2019), https://
www.thoughtco.com/what-is-the-fourth-estate-3368058.
229
Id.
230
Adam Cohen, The Media That Need Citizens: The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate, 85
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014); Dallas Flick, Combatting Fake News: Alternatives to Limiting Social
Media Misinformation and Rehabilitating Quality Journalism, 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 375,
375 (2017).
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social media, however, is not appropriate, given its role in delivering the
news.
Labeled “The Fourth Estate,”231 news reporting institutions are
considered the check and balance on the three other branches of
government.232 Of the Fourth Estate, Adam Cohen wrote, it provides
“information in a democracy, checking government abuses, checking the
private sector, encouraging interest in group formation and promoting selfexpression.”233 The Seventh Circuit noted that the free press worked to
preserve the independence of each branch.234 The Supreme Court similarly
acknowledged the importance a free press has to democracy. 235 Both courts
and commentators acknowledge newspaper, radio, and television as having
a “significant . . . social influence”236 and its role in keeping checks and
balances on the democratic state.237
231

Thomas Carlyle attributed the origin of the term to Edmund Burke, who used it in a
parliamentary debate in 1787 on the opening up of press reporting of the House of Commons of
Great Britain. Delbert Tran, The Fourth Estate As The Final Check, MFIA (Nov. 22, 2016), https:/
/law.yale.edu/mfia/case-disclosed/fourth-estate-final-check; Fourth Estate (n.d.), MerriamWebster’s
collegiate
dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
fourth%20estate#note-1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2019). Earlier writers have applied the term to lawyers,
to the British queen’s consort (acting as a free agent, independent of the king), and to the proletariat.
Id.; Gill, supra note 228
232
Gill, supra note 228. The earliest use in this sense described by Thomas Carlyle in his
book On Heroes and Hero Worship. THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP, AND THE
HEROIC IN HISTORY 392 (1908), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20585/20585-h/20585-h.htm
(ebook). “Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder,
there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.” Gill, supra note 228.
233
Cohen, supra note 230, at 1.
234
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974).
235
N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (“In the First Amendment the Founding
Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.”).
236
Gregory P. Magarian, Forward into the Past: Speech Intermediaries in the Television and
Internet Ages, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 237, 247 (2018) (citing the deference and power granted to media
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S, 254 (1964) and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975)); see also Derry Ridgway, Innocent of Empirical Rigor, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
165 (1995) (citing the influence of the Fourth Estate on pediatric and custody cases); C. Edwin
Baker, Media Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 733
(1991) (“Like the Constitutional separation of powers provisions, the fourth estate role of the press
is designed in part to reduce the risk of abuses of power.”).
237
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1980). One of the best
examples of the acknowledging respect for the press and the information it imparts occurred in when
the court decided Richmond Newspapers, Inc. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. concerned the fourth
murder trial of John Paul Stevenson. Id. at 559. As a consequence of various procedural flaws,
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Courts early on recognized the ability of the Fourth Estate to persuade
those who revered it. 238 In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall raised concerns about
intense newspaper accounts of the duel between Alexander Hamilton and
Aaron Burr. 239 In 1919, the Court more formally recognized the power that
the traditional media has to both persuade and inform, ruling that printed
news articles were sufficient to bias potential jurors in a murder trial. 240 In
both Estes and Sheppard, the Court suggested that the mere presence of
television was enough to sway venirepersons.241
Reverence for traditional news outlets is generated, in part, by the code
of ethics that binds journalists to their craft.242 Members of the Society of
Professional Journalists are obliged to promote the free exchange of
information that is accurate, fair, and thorough. 243 In contrast, the sense that
information posted on social media is immune from ethics requirements
excludes it from reliable and hence influential status.
The perception of social media as a collection of individualized opinions
and ideas is much different from the reality that it is also a purveyor of news.

Stevenson’s first three convictions were dismissed. Id. Due to the constant and high publicity
surrounding this murder, which occurred in a small Virginia County, the defendant requested the
court to bar cameras from the courtroom. Id. The government did not object, and the court accepted
the Defendant’s request. Id. at 560. That same day, Richmond Newspapers, dissatisfied with being
barred from the courtroom, requested “a hearing on a motion to vacate the closure order” citing their
First Amendment Right to be present. Id. The trial court rejected the newspaper’s request. Id. at
561. Richmond Newspaper appealed, and the case made its way to the Supreme Court. Id. at 562.
The Court overturned the trial judge’s decision to ban the press from the courtroom. Id. at 580.
Justice Burger wrote that the goal of the Constitution is to assure “freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government.” Id. at 575. “It is difficult for [the general
populace] to accept what they are prohibited from observing.” Id. at 572. This case makes clear that
the role of the press is to serve as society’s conduit of information. See generally Patrick M. Garry,
Anonymous Sources, Libel Law, and the First Amendment, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 579 (2005); RonNell
Andersen Jones, Justice Scalia and Fourth Estate Skepticism, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 258, 284
(2017).
238
Consider, too, the famous story about Virginia O’Hanlon whose father told her that if The
Sun, a New York Newspaper, confirmed the existence of Santa Claus then Santa Claus must be real.
Editorial, Is There A Santa Claus?, N.Y. SUN, (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.nysun.com/editorials/
yes-virginia/68502/ (reprinted from Sept. 21, 1897).
239
See supra Part II; United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 52 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
240
Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 20 (1919).
241
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547 (1965).
242
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, SPJ Code of Ethics, https://www.spj.org/
ethicscode.asp (revised Sept. 6, 2014).
243
Id.
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To be sure, today the traditional press remains the means by which most
community members learn the news.244 However the medium is changing. In
1996, people got their news exclusively through newspaper reporting,
television, and radio broadcasts. By 2016, a Pew Research Center study
found that 62% of American adults got their news through social media. 245
Eighty-five percent of topics discussed on social media platforms, such as
Twitter, are related to events in the news. 246
Social media sites have surpassed print media as a news source for
Americans.247 A study in the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology found
“that close to 35% of tweets sent as Hurricane Sandy made landfall and
pummeled its way up the East Coast in October 2012 were news related.” 248
Individuals using social media platforms quite often repost stories generated
by traditional news journalists.249 RonNell Anderson Jones calls this
“repeatage” over “reportage.”250 Many members of the same community see
244
Amy Mitchell et al., Trust, Facts and Democracy, (July 7, 2016) (available at http://
www.journalism.org/2016/07/07/pathways-to-news/) (finding that 57% of Americans get their
news from television, 25% from radio and 20% from print newspaper; 38% of Americans get their
news online).
245
Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa Shearer, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER 2, (May 26, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/files/2016/05/
PJ_2016.05.26_social-media-and-news_FINAL-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8QCG-9KGT]
(representing an increase from 49% in 2012.); Haewoon Kwak et al., What is Twitter, a Social
Network or a News Media?, in WWW ‘10: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH INT’L CONF. ON WORLD WIDE
WEB 591-600 (2010); see also Robinson Meyer, The Grime Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study
of Fake News, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2018 https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/
03/largest-study-ever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104/); See discussion supra note 169.
246
Kwak, supra note 245; see also Meyer, supra note 245; see supra note 169.
247
Elisa Shearer, Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a News Source, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 10, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/socialmedia-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/.
248
Louis W. Tompros et al., The Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on
Social Networking Sites in a Post-Alvares, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH
65, 72 (2017) (“Social media likewise played an important role as a source of information during
the 2007 fires that raged across Southern California; the 2008 New England ice storm that wiped
out power for 400,000 homes and businesses in the region; the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, which
killed almost 70,000 people; and the 2008 cyclone in Myanmar, which caused major destruction
and nearly 150,000 fatalities. Additionally, more than 27 million tweets were sent during the April
2013 Boston Marathon bombings, when an intense three-day manhunt ensued after twin explosions
at the Boston Marathon killed three people and injured 264 others.”).
249
Id. at 68.
250
RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper
America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 569–70 (2011) (“A recent report from the Project for
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the same stories on different platforms. 251 In many ways, social media is
merely a vehicle for publications by the Fourth Estate. Under this analysis,
courts should not treat social media any differently. Social media is not
unique; it is merely another medium from which jurors learn of pretrial
publicity.
What social media lacks in “legitimacy,” it gains in human influence. A
2018 M.I.T. study conducted by sixteen political scientists and legal scholars
noted that news spread through social media has a profound ability to
manipulate individual thought.252 Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow,
studying the effect of social media on voting patterns during the 2016
Presidential election conclude that social media posts influence decision
making. 253 Other studies similarly recognize that social media can persuade
an individual’s viewpoint.254 Social media has become a powerful persuasion
technique. 255
Media, as it exists today, does not distinguish between print, broadcast,
and wired. Courts, therefore, should not discount social media evidence
because it lacks the historical import of the Fourth Estate. To the extent juror
influence comes from social media sites, quite often those sites are just
repeating news radio or television reporting, meaning it is as credible as it
was when it came from the “traditional” news media. 256 Moreover, to the
Excellence in Journalism states that for all the robust activity in social media and blogs, ‘these new
media are largely filled with debate dependent on the shrinking base of reporting that began in the
old media.’ The Project’s ongoing analysis of more than a million blogs and social media sites finds
that 80% of the links are to mainstream, legacy media, which are themselves dying out at alarming
rates. Separate studies confirm that new media platforms do not yet serve as a primary source of
local news. Rather, they are more devoted to ‘repeatage’ than to reportage. Some have even
suggested, in the wake of these developments, that the plural of ‘anecdote’ is “blog.’”).
251
David M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News, SCI., 1095 (Mar. 9, 2018), http://
science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1094 (The Atlantic praised it as the most influential of its
kind).
252
Id. at 1094.
253
Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, 211, 232 (2017).
254
Jan H. Kietzmann et al., Social Media? Get Serious! Understanding the Functional Building
Blocks of Social Media, 54 BUSINESS HORIZONS 241, 241–51 (2011), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/
227413605_Social_Media_Get_Serious_Understanding_the_Functional_Building_Blocks_of_Soc
ial_Media; See discussion supra note 169.
255
See Cohen, supra note 230.
256
See How News Happens, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 11, 2010), http://
www.journalism.org/2010/01/11/how-news-happens/.
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extent that Sixth Amendment due process concerns require an evaluation of
actual and presumed prejudice, the empirically identified social media
persuasiveness demands its inclusion in any constitutional challenge. 257 The
science is clear, “hits,” “likes” and “retweets” influence the human mind. 258

3. Social Media Informs Users
For purposes of communicating information, one can divide social media
into two rough categories. One category is the quasi-reporting function. This
category includes not only reposts of credible, newsworthy stories but also
blogs, vlogs, and e-zines, none of which readers find in traditional broadcast
or print medium. 259 The other category is pure sentiment and belief. Social
media in this type includes Facebook In Memoria posts, tweets and the
like. 260 Each category can produce media sufficient to taint a jury.
Social media, in its reporting function, is akin to the type of media courts
have weighed when choosing whether to grant a change of venue. News
reports, television broadcasts of live confessions, and local opinion editorials
have all sufficed to support changes of venue. 261 Social media has yielded

257

United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 332–33 (2011); Marcy Zora, Note, The Real Social
Network: How Jurors’ Use of Social Media and Smart Phones Affects A Defendant’s Sixth
Amendment Rights, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 583–84 (2012).
258
Simon McCarthy Jones, Are Social Networking Sites Controlling Your Mind?, SCI. AM .
(Dec. 8, 2017), (available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/are-social-networkingsites-controlling-your-mind/#googDisableSync); Susan Weinshenk, Why We’re All Addicted to
Texts, Twitter and Google, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Sept. 11, 2012), (available at https://
www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/brain-wise/201209/why-were-all-addicted-texts-twitter-andgoogle).
259
See Manning, J. (2014.) Social media, definition and classes of. In K. Harvey (Ed.),
Encyclopedia of social media and politics (pp. 1158–62), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
290514612_Definition_and_Classes_of_Social_Media; See Garima Kakkar, What are the Different
Types of Social Media, DIGITAL VIDYA, Sept. 12, 2018, https://www.digitalvidya.com/blog/
types-of-social-media/.
260
Kakkar, supra note 259.
261
See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032 (1984); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
352–53 (1966); Rideau v. La., 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 726–28
(1961); Marshall v. U.S., 360 U.S. 310, 312–13 (1959); Stroud v. U.S., 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919);
Wilson v. State, 480 So. 2d 78, 81 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (editorial regarding defendant’s request
for a change of venue sufficient to sustain the motion).
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new types of editorials, blogs and vlogs. Blogs 262 and vlogs263 are personally
made pieces that express the opinion of the blogger or vlogger. 264 RonNell
Anderson Jones argues that blogs are just “a new delivery mechanism” for
traditional opinion pieces.265 A study of more than one million blogs revealed
that mainstream media was the impetus for 80% of the blogs’ discussions. 266
Thus, the line between social media blogs and traditional op-ed pieces is
blurred. Both journalists and legal scholars argue that blogs are replacing
traditional news.267 Anne Flanagan points out that courts grant bloggers
broader journalistic privilege. 268 Most major newspapers publish multiple
blogs online. 269
When considering news reports, courts have never distinguished their
origin. In other words, courts deem biased reports arising from town papers
equal in value to a television program repeating the same information. 270 The
262
Full name is weblog. Blog, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/blog#h1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).
263
Full name is video log. Vlog, MERRIAM -WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vlog (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).
264
Gary Dekmezian, Why Do People Blog? The Benefits of Blogging, HUFFINGTON P OST, Sept.
23,
2015,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-dekmezian/why-do-people-blog-thebe_b_8178624.html.
265
Jones, supra note 250.
266
Id. (citing Project for Excellence in Journalism).
267
Id.; Mercedes Bunz, How Social Networking is Changing Journalism, THE GUARDIAN
(Sept. 18, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2009/sep/18/oxford-social-mediaconvention-2009-journalism-blogs; Alp Mimaroglu, How the Blog Post Op-Ed is Changing News,
CONVINCE & CONVERT, https://www.convinceandconvert.com/digital-marketing/blog-post-op-ed/
(last visited Jan. 11, 2019); Roy Morejon, How Social Media is Replacing Traditional Journalism
as a News Source [Infographic], SOCIAL MEDIA TODAY (June 28, 2012), https://
www.socialmediatoday.com/content/how-social-media-replacing-traditional-journalism-newssource-infographic.
268
Anne Flanagan, Blogging: A Journal Need Not a Journalist Make, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 395, 411 (2005).
269
See,
e.g.,
WASH.
P OST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
?nid=top_nav_opinions&utm_term=.8e28ede19ee2 (last visited Jan. 11, 2019); N.Y. TIMES, https:/
/archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/blogs/directory.html?8qa (last visited Jan. 11.
2019); THE GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/tone/blog (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
270
See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 393 (2010) (“[N]ewspapers in which the[se]
stories appeared were delivered regularly to approximately 95% of the dwellings in” the county
where the trial occurred, which had a population of only 30,000; “radio and TV stations, which
likewise blanketed that county, also carried extensive newscasts covering the same incidents.”);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 344 (1966) (the proceedings were televised, and the daily
record and testimony of witness was printed verbatim in the local newspapers.); Estes v. Texas, 381
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same must be true for pretrial publicity stemming from social media that falls
into the quasi-reporting category. Today the line is too blurred to parse out
where news comes from before considering it as evidence strong enough to
sway a potential juror’s opinion.
The concern judges have with considering social media evidence is that
it is purely opinionated in nature.271 Examples include In Memoriam pages
similar to the one that Ohio court dismissed in Cordoba,272 or the Facebook
likes that the court In re Tsarnaev refused to consider.273 To be fair, these
posts are purely emotional and opinionated in nature. They lack the force of
a Fourth Estate or the credibility of an editor.
However, courts have found the power to persuade jurors in contexts
outside of media outlets. In Norris v. Risley, the Ninth Circuit held that the
presence of women spectators in the courtroom where the defendant was tried
for rape, wearing buttons inscribed with words “Women Against Rape”
deprived the defendant of a fair trial.274 The presence of the spectators, and
the buttons themselves, according to the court, “tainted [defendant]’s right to
a fair trial both by eroding the presumption of innocence and by allowing
extraneous, prejudicial considerations to permeate the proceedings without
subjecting them to the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.”275
In Long v. State, a Florida district court ruled that courtroom observers
wearing jackets embroidered with “Bikers Against Child Abuse” created an
inherent prejudice among jurors considering the accused trial for child
molestation and sexual battery.276 In each instance, a showing of public

U.S. 532, 540–42 (1965) (comparing the privilege of newspaper reporters and television reports to
both be present in the courtroom, then later report what they observed. “[R]eporters of all media,
including television, are always present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever
occurs in open court through their respective media.”).
271
See Denise G. Callahan, Social Media Posts Admissible in Court, JOURNAL-NEWS, Oct
8,
2012,
https://www.journal-news.com/news/social-media-posts-admissible-court/
3QDTMfoPdGGAZ4VBW1bFXN/.
272
State v. Cordoba, No. F-16-001, 2017 WL 5629604, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).
273
In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2015); Laurel J. Sweet, Feds, Tsarnaev defense
battle over jurors’ Facebook pages, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 1, 2015, https://
www.bostonherald.com/2015/10/01/feds-tsarnaev-defense-battle-over-jurors-facebook-pages/.
274
918 F.2d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1990).
275
Id.
276
151 So. 3d 498, 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). But see Nguyen v. State, 977 S.W.2d 450,
457 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. granted), aff’d, 1 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (the court
found that spectators who wore large buttons portraying a color photograph of the deceased while
they were in the courtroom where the jurors could see the buttons during the trial did not result in
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opinion, much like that shared on group chat pages, was sufficient to find
infringement on the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.277
Although it is opinion based, those opinions, perhaps even more than the
traditional news media, tends to carry the day. 278 A study published in the
International Journal of Public Opinion Research suggests a high degree of
personal influence through social media.279 A more recent study found
“individuals are becoming increasingly reliant on others in their online social
networks for news recommendations and political information, and that their
knowledge, opinions, and behaviors are affected by the information stream
and social dynamics within these sites.” 280 Social media has the same power
to influence as traditional print and broadcast media.
Social media is content based. In many instances, its content is merely a
republishing of traditional news media reports. It is not sensible for courts to
distinguish between the potential prejudices of a report depending on the
medium in which it is broadcast. Ignoring social media pretrial publicity
violates the defendant’s constitutional rights.
Courts are incorrect in their assumptions as to why they should not subject
pretrial social media publicity to constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court
has held that courts may not discount the threat of technology because it is
new. 281 While there is a healthy sense of skepticism associated to social
media, there is a significant amount of published content to which society
ascribes a degree of credibility. And finally, today many users get their news

external influence that affected the outcome of the trial.); In People v. Zielesch, the defendant’s right
to a fair trial was not violated by allowing courtroom spectators to wear buttons displaying a
photograph of the victim, a state highway patrolman, because buttons were not unduly suggestive
of guilt, and the trial court instructed jurors to disregard the buttons, not to allow sympathy for
victim to influence their decision, and to base their decision solely on the evidence. 101 Cal. Rptr.
3d 628, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
277
See Leblanc, supra note 187 (where signs outside the courtroom that read “charge Amber
with Murder” were not sufficient to grant a change of venue).
278
See, e.g., John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evidence
from Social Media Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 468 (2011) (citing examples of
attorneys using Facebook statements to incriminate defendants in a criminal case, Twitterpics or
YouTube videos to sway the court in a child-custody case, and LinkedIn testimonials to influence
the outcome in employment litigation).
279
Brian Weeks et al., Online Influence? Social Media Use, Opinion Leadership, and Political
Persuasion, 29 INT’L J. OF PUB. OPINION RES. 214, 214 (2017).
280
Id.
281
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312 (Kennedy J., concurring); see also Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 541 (1965).
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from social media, and to exclude social media content from consideration
would result in a clear violation of constitutional rights.
There are identifiable concerns with social media. Briefly noted, it is
often difficult to identify the source of published information. 282 “Repeatage”
can result in a game of “telephone,” diluting facts with each repost, 283 and in
282

In 2018, there has been concern about Russian bots being used on social media to influence
American society. Sheera Frenkel & Daisuke Wakabayashi, After Florida School Shootings,
Russian ‘Bot’ Army Pounced, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
02/19/technology/russian-bots-school-shooting.html. One of the earliest known examples of a
large-scale Russian bot attack came on February 14, 2018, one hour after the Florida, Parkland
school shooting. Id. An “army” of suspected Russian bots helped amplify debate about gun control.
Id. The fake accounts addressed the situation just as quickly as the local cable news networks. Id.
Prior to the school shooting, those fake accounts made posts concerning Robert Muller’s
investigation into the Russian influence on the 2016 presidential election. Jonathon Morgan, chief
executive of New Knowledge, a company that tracks online disinformation campaigns, stated, “This
is pretty typical for [bots], to hop on breaking news like this. The bots focus on anything that is
divisive for Americans. Almost systematically.” Id.;
Russian bots have long been suspected of interfering in the 2016 election. Scott Shane, The
Fake Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitterelection.html?action=click&contentCollection=Technology&module=inline&region=Marginalia
&pgtype=article). Hundreds of Russian-linked accounts promoted false stories about Hillary
Clinton and spread articles based on leaked emails from Democratic operatives that had been
obtained by Russian hackers. Id. The bots would often support issues that President Trump tweeted
about. Id. For example, the accounts promoted hashtags that centered around attacking NFL players
who kneeled during the national anthem to protest racial injustice. Id. J. M. Berger, a researcher in
Cambridge, Mass., found that often the accounts posted replies to President Trump’s tweets. Id.
“Mr. Trump ‘received more direct replies than anyone else.’ Clearly this was an effort to influence
Donald Trump. They know he reads tweets.’” Id.
Twitter is not the only social media platform affected. Id. Facebook officials disclosed that
they had shut down several hundred Russian-bot accounts. Id. Those accounts were used to push
divisive issues during the 2016 campaign. Id. However, according to Facebook, the fake accounts
are not as prevalent as everyone believes. “Facebook officials estimated that of all the “civic
content” posted on the site in connection with the United States election, less than one-tenth of one
percent resulted from ‘information operations’ like the Russian campaign.” Id.; See discussion
supra at note 170.
283
Jones, supra note 250. The internet is like playing a giant game of “telephone,” except you
are playing with hundreds of millions of people, not just your friends on game night. With so many
people contributing their individual thoughts, opinions, and understanding of any given situation,
there are bound to be mistakes made and false information thrown into the mix. At this point, almost
every major news organization has an online presence. “Even print, online, and television journalists
have turned to social networks for both news content and sources.” Lili Levi, Social Media and the
Press, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1548 (2012). “Facebook is being used to report news. Twitter has
become indispensable in the dissemination of information about breaking news.” Id. “Mainstream

9 TENZER (DO NOT DELETE)

6/18/2019 11:31 AM

2019]SOCIAL MEDIA, VENUE, AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 461
many instances the news people learn their news from a group of like-minded
individuals leading to a skewed perception of opinion. 284 The Supreme
Court’s totality of circumstances test accounts for misperceptions and
misinterpretation. 285 This next section will explain how the constitutional
evaluation for whether pretrial publicity demands a change of venue can
effectively sift out the inherent flaws in social media publicity, thereby
allowing courts to appropriately weigh its potential to cause actual or
presumed prejudice among jurors.

B. The Totality of Circumstances Test Properly Contemplates Social

journalists have also used social media to gather background, ask questions, solicit story ideas, and
crowdsource information for their reports.” Id. “Newsgathering now includes receiving and
disseminating reports and video from people not affiliated with professional news organizations,
sometimes without editing or fact checking.” Id. at 1548–49. If there is a lack of fact checking, it is
likely that mistaken information will be published, then disseminated as truth. That mistaken
information will continue to be passed along until the story is so far from the truth that it is hardly
recognizable. For example, “there are stories of news reporters repeating Twitter hoaxes” as though
they were truth. Id. at 1557. Anyone hearing those stories, who are unfamiliar with the correct story
on Twitter, will assume that what they just heard from the reporter is the truth. Those individuals
will then spread the mistaken story to others. “[L]arge communities are not necessarily selfcorrecting,” which should come as no surprise to anyone who has played telephone. Id. at 1558. Just
playing with a few people inevitably leads to mistakes, imagine playing with hundreds of millions
of people. “Given the amplifying character of the Internet and social media, and in light of the
decline in authority of the institutional press, there is good reason to be concerned about the impact
of uncorrected inaccuracy.” Id. at 1559.
284
Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News”, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 317
(2017) (discussing how fake news can spread so rapidly because people trust their Facebook
“friends” more than traditional news media); Levi, Social Media, supra note 283 (“Readers do not
automatically rely on the editorial judgment of professional newspaper editors even to create the
front page. Instead, they depend on their friends and social media networks to recommend what
news to follow.”). Id. at 1550–51. People are more likely to become friends with individuals who
they have things in common with, and who share common interest. For example, people may
become friends because they share a common political affiliation; they may be members of the
Young Democrats or Republicans Club. This can cause potential danger when it comes to the spread
of “fake news.” If Friend A posts a false story about a Presidential candidate that was unknowingly
generated by a Russian bot, Friend B will see that story appear on their “wall” and may take it as
true. Friend B may then repost that story so Friend C sees it. The cycle will continue until dozens
of people now believe “fake news” to be the truth.
285
See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 398–99 (2010) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 723 (1960)).
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Media Bias
Four decades of Supreme Court precedent make clear that judges
deciding motions to change venues must apply the totality of circumstances
test to pretrial publicity.286 Under the test a court must look at: (1) the size
and character of the community in which the crime occurred; (2) whether the
stories contained confessions of other “prejudicial information of the type
readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight;”
(3) the time that elapsed between initial reporting of the crime and the trial;
and (4) the fact that the jury acquitted the defendant of some of the charged
crimes. 287 This test can easily contemplate social media evidence.
Courts can easily apply the totality of circumstances test to claims of
unfair pretrial publicity resulting from social media exposure. The relative
newness of the medium is of little consequence in deciding whether to grant
a change of venue. Given that a growing segment of the population gathers
journalistic news from social media, social media is no different from the
type of traditional news media the Court considered in previous constitutional
challenges.
Social media as a medium is most distinct from traditional media in that
a segment of the content is opinion-based, rather than news oriented.
Opinion-based Facebook quotes and tweets are examples of the kind of
opinion-based pieces that have been problematic for judges. The totality of
the circumstances test however, is prepared to accommodate and inevitably
dismiss, this type of evidence.
Consider State v. Cordoba, the case in tiny Wauseon, Ohio, where the
victim’s family ran two Facebook In Memoria pages that were as the judge
said “full of enmity and contempt” for the defendant.288 Absent proof of
actual prejudice, these Facebook pages would probably not be sufficient to
support a change of venue motion. Prong two requires that the judge ask
whether the stories contained confessions or other “prejudicial information
of the type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from
sight.”289 Understanding that typically, members of an emotionally charged
community generate Facebook In Memoria, the court stated that they are not
likely to prejudice the viewer or reader. 290 It would be difficult, under the
286

See Id. at 382–84.
Id. at 382.
288
No. F-16-001, 2017 WL 5629604, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2017).
289
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 382.
290
Cordoba, 2017 WL 5629604, at *3.
287
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circumstances, to prove presumed prejudice. If, however, upon voir dire, a
judge discovers that In Memoria or similar posts do prejudice enough of a
jury pool that the court cannot impanel an impartial jury, then the judge has
properly identified social media evidence that has challenged defendant’s
right to a fair trial. Under the latter circumstances, a review is necessary
because a court must consider any evidence that threatens the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right.

V.

CONCLUSION

Social media content poses a constitutional threat to defendants’ rights
equal to that of the traditional news media, and courts are violating
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights by failing to consider it. Concerns about
social media’s features that are distinguishable from traditional media are
misguided. Furthermore, the totality of circumstances test grants judges wide
latitude to dismiss prejudicial social media pretrial publicity that lacks
credibility or persuasiveness.
Biased reporting and juror perception were of paramount importance to
the Supreme Court considering whether pretrial publicity justified a change
of venue. Bias is inherent in social media and, therefore, warrants its
consideration in change of venue motions. Juror perception is an integral
factor in the totality of the circumstances test and demands that judges inquire
into whether those called to sit on a jury can neutralize the social media
information to which they were exposed.
Since the days of Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr, courts have
recognized the media’s threat to justice. Along the way, the Supreme Court
has contemplated new technology—first radio, then television. Today, the
latest media—social media—poses the same threat to due process as does the
“traditional media.” Ignoring social media evidence when deciding change
of venue motions invades the unbiased sensibility of those who are asked to
sit in judgment.

